Civil Code

Part I, Part II, and Part III of the Civil Code are established as set out in the Separate Volume.

The date on which this Act comes into effect is specified by Imperial Ordinance.

The Property Part, the Acquisition of Property Part, the Security for Claims Part, and the Evidence Part of the Civil Code (Act No. 28 of 1890) are repealed as of the date of promulgation of this Act.

(Separate Volume)

Private rights must be congruent with the public welfare.

The exercise of rights and performance of duties must be done in good faith.

Abuse of rights is not permitted.

This Code must be construed so as to honor the dignity of individuals and the essential equality of both sexes.

The enjoyment of private rights commences at birth.

Unless otherwise prohibited by applicable laws, regulations, or treaties, foreign nationals enjoy private rights.

If the person performing a juridical act did not have mental capacity when manifesting the relevant intention, the juridical act is void.

The age of majority is 18 years of age.

A minor must obtain the consent of the minor's legal representative to perform a juridical act; provided, however, that this does not apply to a juridical act for merely acquiring a right or being released from an obligation.

A juridical act in contravention of the provisions of the preceding paragraph may be revoked.

Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (1), a minor may freely dispose of property that the legal representative has permitted the minor to dispose of for a specified purpose, to an extent that falls within the scope of that purpose. The same applies if the minor disposes of property that the legal representative has permitted the minor to dispose of without specifying a purpose.

A minor who is permitted to conduct one or multiple types of business has the same capacity to act as an adult as far as that business is concerned.

In a case referred to in the preceding paragraph, if there are grounds that make the minor unable to sustain that business, the legal representative may revoke or limit the permission therefor in accordance with the provisions of Part IV (Relatives).

The family court may decide to commence a guardianship in respect of a person who constantly lacks the capacity to appreciate the person's own situation due to a mental disorder or disability, at the request of the person in question, that person's spouse, that person's relative within the fourth degree of kinship, the guardian of a minor, the supervisor of a minor's guardian, the curator, the curator's supervisor, the assistant, the assistant's supervisor, or a public prosecutor.

A person subject to a decision for commencement of guardianship becomes an adult ward, and an adult guardian is appointed for that person.

A juridical act performed by an adult ward may be revoked; provided, however, that this does not apply to the purchase of daily necessities or to any other act involved in day-to-day life.

If the grounds prescribed in Article 7 cease to exist, the family court must set aside the decision for the commencement of guardianship at the request of the person in question, that person's spouse, that person's relative within the fourth degree of kinship, the guardian (meaning a minor's guardian or an adult guardian; the same applies below), the guardian's supervisor (meaning the supervisor of a minor's guardian or the adult guardian's supervisor; the same applies below), or a public prosecutor.

The family court may decide to commence a curatorship in respect of a person whose capacity to appreciate their own situation is extremely inadequate due to a mental disorder or disability, at the request of the person in question, the person's spouse, the person's relative within the fourth degree of kinship, the guardian, the guardian's supervisor, the assistant, the assistant's supervisor, or a public prosecutor; provided, however, that this does not apply to a person in respect of whom a cause stated in Article 7 exists.

A person subject to a decision for commencement of curatorship becomes a person under curatorship, and a curator is appointed for that person.

A person under curatorship must obtain the consent of the curator in order to perform any of the following acts; provided, however, that this does not apply to an act provided for in the proviso of Article 9:

receiving or using principal;

borrowing money or guaranteeing an obligation;

performing an act with the purpose of acquiring or losing any right regarding immovables or other significant property;

performing a procedural act;

giving a gift, reaching a settlement, or entering into an arbitration agreement (meaning an arbitration agreement as provided in Article 2, paragraph (1) of the Arbitration Act (Act No. 138 of 2003));

accepting or renouncing a succession or dividing an estate;

refusing an offer of a gift, renouncing a legacy, accepting an offer of gift with burden, or accepting a legacy with burden;

constructing a new building, renovating, expanding, or undertaking major repairs;

granting a lease for a term that exceeds the period stated in Article 602; or

performing any of the acts stated in the preceding items as a legal representative of a person with qualified legal capacity (meaning a minor, adult ward, or person under curatorship or a person under assistantship who is subject to a decision referred to in Article 17, paragraph (1); the same applies below).

At the request of a person referred to in the main clause of Article 11 or the curator or curator's supervisor, the family court may decide that the person under curatorship must also obtain the consent of the curator before performing an act other than those stated in each of the items of the preceding paragraph; provided, however, that this does not apply to an act provided for in the proviso to Article 9.

If the curator does not consent to an act for which the person under curatorship must obtain the curator's consent even though it is unlikely to prejudice the interests of the person under curatorship, the family court may grant permission that operates in lieu of the curator's consent at the request of the person under curatorship.

An act for which the person under curatorship must obtain the curator's consent may be revoked if the person performs it without obtaining the curator's consent or a permission that operates in lieu of it.

If the grounds prescribed in the main clause of Article 11 cease to exist, the family court must set aside the decision for the commencement of curatorship at the request of the person in question, that person's spouse, that person's relative within the fourth degree of kinship, the guardian of a minor, the supervisor of a minor's guardian, the curator, the curator's supervisor, or a public prosecutor.

At the request of a person provided for in the preceding paragraph, the family court may set aside all or part of the decision referred to in paragraph (2) of the preceding Article.

The family court may decide to commence an assistance in respect of a person whose capacity to appreciate their own situation is inadequate due to a mental disorder or disability, at the request of the person in question, that person's spouse, that person's relative within the fourth degree of kinship, the guardian, the guardian's supervisor, the curator, the curator's supervisor, or a public prosecutor; provided, however, that this does not apply to a person with respect to whom there are grounds as prescribed in Article 7 or the main clause of Article 11.

The issuance of a decision for commencement of assistance at the request of a person other than the person in question requires the consent of the person in question.

A decision for commencement of assistance must be made concurrent with a decision referred to in Article 17, paragraph (1) or a decision referred to in Article 876-9, paragraph (1).

A person subject to a decision for commencement of assistance becomes a person under assistantship, and an assistant is appointed for that person.

At the request of the person referred to in the main clause of Article 15, paragraph (1) or the assistant or assistant's supervisor, the family court may decide that the person under assistantship must obtain the consent of the person's assistant in order to perform a specific juridical act; provided, however, that the acts that such a decision may establish as those for which the person must obtain the consent of the assistant are restricted to a part of the acts provided for in Article 13, paragraph (1).

The issuance of a decision referred to in the preceding paragraph at the request of a person other than the person in question requires the consent of the person in question.

If the assistant does not consent to an act for which the person under assistantship must obtain the assistant's consent even though it is unlikely to prejudice the interests of the person under assistantship, the family court may grant permission that operates in lieu of the assistant's consent, at the request of the person under assistantship.

An act for which the person under assistantship must obtain the assistant's consent may be revoked if the person performs it without obtaining the assistance's consent or a permission that operates in lieu of it.

If the grounds prescribed in the main clause of Article 15, paragraph (1) cease to exist, the family court must set aside the decision for commencement of assistance at the request of the person in question, that person's spouse, that person's relative within the fourth degree of kinship, the guardian of a minor, the supervisor of a minor's guardian, the assistant, the assistant's supervisor, or a public prosecutor.

At the request of a person as prescribed in the preceding paragraph, the family court may set aside all or part of the decision referred to in paragraph (1) of the preceding Article.

If setting aside the decision referred to in paragraph (1) of the preceding Article and the decision referred to in Article 876-9, paragraph (1) in their entirety, the family court must set aside the decision for commencement of assistance.

If the family court decides to commence a guardianship and the person in question is a person under curatorship or a person under assistantship, it must set aside the decision for commencement of the curatorship or commencement of assistance respecting that person.

The provisions of the preceding paragraph apply mutatis mutandis if the court decides to commence a curatorship and the person in question is an adult ward or a person under assistantship or if the court decides to commence an assistance and the person in question is an adult ward or a person under curatorship.

After a person with qualified legal capacity who is involved in dealings with another party becomes a person with the legal capacity to act (meaning a person whose legal capacity to act is not subject to restrictions; the same applies below), the other party to those dealings may fix a period of one month or longer and demand that the person give a definite answer within that period of time as to whether the person will ratify an act that the person may revoke. In such a case, if the person fails to send a definite answer within that period of time, the person is deemed to have ratified that act.

The second sentence of the preceding paragraph also applies if, before the person with qualified legal capacity becomes a person with the legal capacity to act, the other party to dealings involving the person with qualified legal capacity lodges the demand prescribed in the preceding paragraph with the legal representative, curator, or assistant of that person with respect to an act within the scope of their authority, and they fail to send a definite answer within the fixed period of time referred to in that paragraph.

If a person does not send notice within the period of time stated in the preceding two paragraphs indicating that the person has completed any special formalities that an act requires, the person is deemed to have revoked that act.

The other party to dealings involving a person with qualified legal capacity may lodge a demand with a person under curatorship or with a person under assistantship who is subject to a decision referred to in Article 17, paragraph (1) to demand that the person get the curator or assistant to ratify an act within the fixed period referred to in paragraph (1). In such a case, if the person under curatorship or person under assistantship does not send notice within that period indicating that the person has gotten the curator or assistant to ratify the act in question, the person is deemed to have revoked that act.

If a person with qualified legal capacity uses fraudulent means to induce another person to believe that the person is a person with legal capacity to act, the person may not revoke the act in question.

A person's principal place of daily activity is that person's domicile.

If a person's domicile is unknown, the person's residence is deemed to be the person's domicile.

If a person does not have a domicile in Japan, the person's residence is deemed to be the person's domicile, regardless of whether the person is a Japanese national or a foreign national; provided, however, that this does not apply if the law of domicile is to be applied in accordance with the provisions of the laws that establish the governing law.

If a temporary address is selected for an act, that temporary address is deemed to be the domicile as far as that act is concerned.

If a person who has taken leave of the domicile or residence up until then (referred to as an "absentee" below) has not appointed an administrator for the person's property (in this Section referred to simply as an "administrator" below), the family court, at the request of an interested person or a public prosecutor, may order the necessary dispositions with regard to the administration of that property. The same applies if the administrator's authority is extinguished during the absence of the absentee.

If an absentee appoints an administrator after an order under the provisions of the preceding paragraph has been issued, the family court must set aside that order at the request of the person's administrator, an interested person, or a public prosecutor.

If an absentee has appointed an administrator but it is unclear whether the absentee is dead or alive, the family court may replace that administrator with another at the request of an interested person or a public prosecutor.

An administrator appointed by the family court pursuant to the provisions of the preceding two Articles must prepare a list of the property that the administrator is to administer. In such a case, the expenses incurred are paid from the property of the absentee.

If it is unclear whether an absentee is dead or alive and an interested person or a public prosecutor so requests, the family court may also order the administrator appointed by the absentee to prepare the list referred to in the preceding paragraph.

Beyond what is provided for in the preceding two paragraphs, the family court may order the administrator to make the dispositions that the court finds to be necessary to preserve the property of the absentee.

If an administrator needs to perform an act exceeding the authority provided for in Article 103, the administrator may perform that act after obtaining the permission of the family court. The same applies if it is unclear whether the absentee is dead or alive and the administrator needs to perform an act exceeding the authority established by the absentee.

The family court may require an administrator to provide reasonable security with respect to the administration and return of the property.

The family court may grant reasonable remuneration to the administrator from the property of the absentee based on the relationship between the administrator and absentee and other circumstances.

If it has been unclear for seven years whether an absentee is dead or alive, the family court may enter a declaration of presumed death at the request of an interested person.

The provisions of the preceding paragraph also apply if it has been unclear whether a person who has entered a war zone, was aboard a vessel that has sunk, or was otherwise exposed to a danger likely to result in a person's death is dead or alive, for one year after the war has ended, the vessel sank, or other danger has passed.

A person subject to a declaration of presumed death pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (1) of the preceding Article is deemed to have died when the period of time referred to in that paragraph ended, and a person subject to a declaration of presumed death pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (2) of that Article is deemed to have died when that danger had passed.

Having received proof that a person presumed dead is alive or they died at a time that is different from the time provided for in the preceding Article, the family court must revoke the declaration of presumed death, at the request of the person themselves or an interested party. In this case, the revocation does not affect the validity of any act performed in good faith after the declaration of presumed death but before its revocation.

A person who has acquired property due to a declaration of presumed death loses the rights in question due to its revocation; provided, however, that the person has the obligation to return that property only to the extent that the person has actually been enriched.

If more than one person dies and it is unclear whether one of them was still alive after the death of another, it is presumed that they all died at the same time.

No corporation can be formed unless it is formed pursuant to the provisions of this Code and other laws.

The formation, organization, operation, and management of corporations including corporations formed for academic activities, art, charity, worship, religion and other public interests, and corporations formed for engaging in business for profit are governed by the provisions of this Code and other laws.

A corporation has rights and is subject to duties, subject to the provisions of laws and regulations and within the scope of the purpose stated in its articles of incorporation and other basic provisions.

With the exception of states, any administrative division of states, and foreign companies, the formation of a foreign corporation is not recognized; provided, however, that, this does not apply to any foreign corporation that are recognized pursuant to the provisions of a law or treaty.

A foreign corporation recognized pursuant to the provisions of the preceding paragraph possesses the same private rights as those possessed by a corporation of the same kind which can be formed in Japan; provided, however, that, this does not apply to any right that a foreign national is not entitled to enjoy or to any right for which there are special provisions in a law or treaty.

Corporations and foreign corporations are to complete their registration pursuant to the provisions of this Code and other laws and regulations.

If a foreign corporation (limited to the foreign corporation prescribed in the proviso to Article 35, paragraph (1); the same applies in this Article below) establishes an office in Japan, the registration of the foreign corporation must be completed by registering the following particulars at the location of the office, within three weeks:

the law governing the incorporation of the foreign corporations;

the purpose;

the name;

the address of the office;

the duration, if it is specified; and

the name and address of its representative.

If there is a change in any of the particulars stated in the items of the preceding paragraph, a registration of the change must be completed for within three weeks. In this case, the change may not be asserted against any third party before it is registered.

If a provisional disposition order suspending the execution of duties by the representative or appointing a person who will perform those duties on behalf of the representative is issued or a ruling changing or setting aside that provisional disposition order is made, its registration must be completed. In this case, the provisions of the second sentence of the preceding paragraph apply mutatis mutandis.

If particulars that must be registered pursuant to the provisions of the preceding two paragraphs arises in a foreign country, the period for registration is counted from the day on which the notice of these particulars reached.

If a foreign corporation established an office in Japan for the first time, a third party may decline to recognize that corporation's formation until it has been registered in the location of that office.

If a foreign corporation relocates its office, the registration of relocation must be completed at the former location within three weeks and the registration of the foreign corporation must be completed by registering the items of paragraph (1) at the new location within four weeks.

If a foreign corporation relocates its office within the jurisdictional district of the same registry office, it is sufficient for it to register its relocation.

If a representative of a foreign corporation fails to complete a registration provided for in this Article, the representative is subject to a civil fine of not more than 500,000 yen.

The term "things" as used in this Code means tangible objects.

Land and any fixtures thereto are immovables.

Things other than immovables are movables.

If the owner of a thing attaches a second thing that the owner owns to the thing to serve the ordinary use of the thing, the thing that the owner attaches is an accessory thing.

An accessory thing is disposed of together with the principal thing if the principal thing is disposed of.

Products obtained from the intended use of a thing are its natural fruits.

Money and other things that may be obtained in exchange for the use of any thing are civil fruits.

The ownership of natural fruits is acquired by the person entitled to obtain them when they are separated from the original thing.

A person acquires civil fruits in proportion to the duration of the right to obtain them, as calculated on a prorated, daily basis.

A juridical act that is against public policy is void.

If the person performing a juridical act manifests an intention that is inconsistent with the provisions of laws and regulations that are not related to public policy, that intention prevails.

If a custom is inconsistent with the provisions of laws and regulations that are not related to public policy and it is found that the person performing a juridical act has the intention to abide by that custom, that custom prevails.

The validity of a manifestation of intention is not impaired even if the person making it does so while knowing that it does not reflect that person's true intention; provided, however, that if the other party knew or could have known that the manifestation was not the true intention of the person who made it, that manifestation of intention is void.

The nullity of a manifestation of intention under the provisions of the proviso to the preceding paragraph may not be duly asserted against a third party in good faith.

A false manifestation of intention that a person makes in collusion with another person is void.

The nullity of a manifestation of intention under the provisions of the preceding paragraph may not be duly asserted against a third party in good faith.

A manifestation of intention may be revoked if it is based on either of the following mistakes, and the mistake is material in light of the purpose of the juridical act and common sense trading practices:

a mistake wherein the person lacks the intention that corresponds to the manifestation of intention; or

a mistake wherein the person making the manifestation of intention holds an understanding that does not correspond to the truth with regard to the circumstances which the person has taken as the basis for the juridical act.

A manifestation of intention under the provisions of item (ii) of the preceding paragraph may be revoked only if it has been indicated that the circumstances in question are being taken as the basis for the juridical act.

If a mistake is due to gross negligence on the part of the person making the manifestation of intention, that person may not revoke a manifestation of intention as under paragraph (1), except in the following cases:

if the other party knew, or did not know due to gross negligence, of the mistake on the part of the person making the manifestation of intention; or

if the other party was under the same mistake as the person making the manifestation of intention.

The revocation of a manifestation of intention under the provisions of paragraph (1) may not be duly asserted against a third party in good faith acting without negligence.

A manifestation of intention based on fraud or duress may be revoked.

If a third party commits a fraud inducing a first party to make a manifestation of intention to a second party, that manifestation of intention may be revoked only if the second party knew or could have known that fact.

The revocation of a manifestation of intention induced by fraud under the provisions of the preceding two paragraphs may not be duly asserted against a third party in good faith acting without negligence.

A manifestation of intention becomes effective at the time notice of the manifestation reaches the other party.

If the other party prevents notice of a manifestation of intention from reaching them without a legitimate reason, the notice is deemed to have reached that party at the time it would have normally reached them.

The effect of a manifestation of intention is not impaired even if the person making it dies, loses mental capacity, or becomes subject to restrictions on their legal capacity to act after having sent the notice.

A manifestation of intention may be made by means of public notice if the person making it is unable to ascertain who the other party is or is unable to ascertain the whereabouts thereof.

Public notice referred to in the preceding paragraph is effected by a notice being posted in the posting area of the relevant court and an indication that that posting has been made being published in the Official Gazette at least once, in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 109 of 1996) on service by publication; provided, however, that if the court finds it to be suitable, it may order that a notice be posted in the posting area of the city office, ward office, town hall, or any facility equivalent to these in lieu of the relevant information being published in the Official Gazette.

A manifestation of intention by public notice is deemed to have reached the other party once two weeks have passed since the day when the relevant information was last published in the Official Gazette or once two weeks have passed since the day on which the relevant information started to be posted in lieu of being so published; provided, however, that the effect of a manifestation of intention having reached the other party does not arise if the person making it was negligent in not ascertaining the other party or the whereabouts.

If the person making a manifestation of intention is unable to ascertain who the other party is, the procedures involved in public notice are under the jurisdiction of the summary court that has jurisdiction over the locality where the person making the manifestation of intention is domiciled; if the person making a manifestation of intention is unable to ascertain the whereabouts of the other party, the procedures involved in public notice are under the jurisdiction of the summary court that has jurisdiction over the locality of the last known domicile of the other party.

The court must have the person making a manifestation of intention prepay the expenses associated with a public notice.

Any person may not assert a manifestation of intention against the other party to that if that other party had no mental capacity or was a minor or an adult ward at the time of receiving it; provided, however, that this does not apply after either of the following persons learns of the manifestation of intention:

the legal representative of the other party; or

the other party, after that other party's mental capacity has been restored or after that other party has become a person with capacity to act.

A manifestation of intention that an agent makes indicating that they will be making a manifestation of intention on behalf of the principal within the scope of the agent's authority binds the principal directly.

The provisions of the preceding paragraph apply mutatis mutandis to a manifestation of intention that a third party makes to an agent.

A manifestation of intention that an agent makes without having indicated that they will be acting on behalf of the principal is deemed to be one that the agent has made on their own account; provided, however, that if the other party knew or could have known that the agent was acting on behalf of the principal, the provisions of paragraph (1) of the preceding Article apply mutatis mutandis.

If the validity of a manifestation of intention that an agent has made to the other party is to be influenced by the absence of intention, by mistake, by fraud, or by duress; by the recipient's knowledge of or negligence in not knowing of a particular circumstance; whether or not any fact was present is decided as it concerns the agent.

If the validity of a manifestation of intention that the other party has made to the agent is to be influenced by the recipient's knowledge of or negligence in not knowing of a particular circumstance, whether or not any fact was present is decided as it concerns the agent.

If an agent who has been entrusted with performing a specific juridical act performs that act, the principal may not assert that the agent did not know of any particular circumstance of which the principal knew. The same applies to any circumstance of which the principal did not know due to the principal's own negligence.

An act that a person with qualified legal capacity performs as an agent of another person may not be revoked on the grounds of qualified legal capacity; provided, however, that this does not apply to an act performed by a person with qualified legal capacity as a legal representative of another person with qualified legal capacity.

An agent who has no specifically defined authority has the authority to perform the following acts only:

acts of preservation; and

acts with the purpose of using or improving a thing or right that is the subject matter of the agency, to the extent that this does not change the nature of that thing or right.

An agent appointed by mandate may not appoint a subagent unless the authorization of the principal is obtained or there is a compelling reason to do so.

A legal representative may appoint a subagent on its own responsibility. In such a case, if there is a compelling reason to do so, the legal representative is only liable to the principal for the appointment and supervision of the subagent.

A subagent represents the principal with respect to acts within the scope of that subagent's authority.

A subagent has the same rights and obligations as an agent in relation to the principal and third parties within the scope of that subagent's authority.

If an agent performs an act that falls within the scope of that agent's authority to represent for the purpose of benefiting the agent's own interests or the interests of a third party, and the other party knew of or could have ascertained that purpose, that act is deemed to be an act performed by a person without authority to represent.

An act that a person performs as an agent of the counterparty or as agent of both parties for the same juridical act is deemed to be an act performed by a person without authority to represent; provided, however, that this does not apply to the performance of an obligation or to an act authorized by the principal in advance.

Beyond what is provided for in the main clause of the preceding paragraph, an act for which the interest of the agent conflicts with the interest of the principal is deemed to be an act performed by a person without authority to represent; provided, however, that this does not apply to an act authorized by the principal in advance.

A person who indicates to a third party that the person granted certain authority to represent to another person is liable for an act performed between that other person and that third party within the scope of the authority to represent; provided, however, that this does not apply if the third party knew or did not know due to negligence that the other person has not been granted the authority to represent.

If a person who indicates to a third party that the person granted authority to represent to another person is, pursuant to the provisions of the preceding paragraph, liable for acts performed by that other person in relation to the third party within the scope of the authority to represent, and the other person performs in relation to the third party an act beyond the scope of the authority to represent, the person who makes the indication is liable for that act only if the third party has reasonable grounds for believing that the other person has authority to represent in that act.

The provisions of the main clause of paragraph (1) of the preceding Article apply mutatis mutandis if an agent performs an act exceeding the agent's authority to represent and a third party has reasonable grounds for believing that the agent has the authority as an agent.

The authority to represent ceases to exist upon:

death of the principal; and

death of the agent, or order commencing bankruptcy proceeding or a decision for commencement of guardianship against the agent.

The authority to represent by mandate ceases to exist, other than on the grounds stated in the respective items of the preceding paragraph, upon the termination of the mandate.

A person that grants authority to represent to another person is liable towards a third party for an act performed between that other person and the third party within the scope of the authority to represent after the extinction of the authority to represent if that third party does not know the fact that the authority to represent has ceased to exist; provided, however, that this does not apply if the third party does not know the fact due to negligence.

If a person that grants authority to represent to another person is, pursuant to the provisions of the preceding paragraph, liable for an act performed between that other person and a third party within the scope of the authority to represent after the extinction of that authority to represent, and the other person performs in relation to the third party an act beyond the scope of the authority to represent, the person that grants authority to represent is liable for that act only if the third party has reasonable grounds for believing that the other person has authority to represent for the act.

A contract concluded by a person who acts as the agent of another person but has no authority to represent does not bind the principal unless the principal ratifies it.

The ratification or refusal to ratify may not be duly asserted against the counterparty unless it is made to that counterparty; provided, however, that this does not apply if the counterparty has come to know the ratification or refusal to ratify.

In the case referred to in the preceding Article, the counterparty may demand, by specifying a reasonable period of time, that the principal give a definite answer on whether or not the principal will ratify within that period of time. In this case, if the principal fails to give a definite answer within that period, the principal is deemed to have refused to ratify.

A counterparty may rescind a contract that a person without the authority to represent has concluded until the principal ratifies it; provided, however, that this does not apply if the counterparty knew at the time of the conclusion of the contract that the agent had no authority to represent.

Ratification is retroactive to the time of the conclusion of the contract unless a particular intention is manifested; provided, however, that this may not prejudice the rights of a third party.

A person who concludes a contract as an agent of another person is liable to the counterparty for the performance of the contract or damages, as chosen by the counterparty, unless the person proves their authority to represent or the principal ratifies the contract.

The provisions of the preceding paragraph do not apply in the following cases:

if the counterparty knew that the person who concluded the contract as an agent of the other person had no authority to represent;

if the counterparty was negligent in not knowing that the person who concluded the contract as an agent of the other person had no authority to represent; provided, however, that this does not apply if the person who concluded a contract as an agent of the other person knew themselves to have no authority to represent; or

if the legal capacity to act of the person who concluded the contract as an agent of the other person was subject to restrictions.

With respect to a unilateral juridical act, the provisions of Articles 113 through the preceding Article apply mutatis mutandis only if the counterparty, at the time of the act, either agrees for the person holding themselves out as an agent to act without the authority to represent or does not contest the authority to represent of that person. The same applies if that counterparty does a unilateral juridical act to a person without authority to represent with the consent of that person.

A void act does not become effective by ratification; provided, however, that if a party ratifies an act knowing that the act is void, it is deemed that the party did a new act.

An act that is revocable on the grounds of the qualified legal capacity to act of the person who did the act may be revoked only by the person with qualified legal capacity (in the case of an act performed by the person as a legal representative of another person with limited capacity, including that other person with limited capacity), or their agent or successor, or a person who has the authority to give consent thereto.

An act that is revocable on the grounds of a mistake, fraud or duress may be revoked only by the person who made the defective manifestation of intention, or their agent or successor.

An act that has been revoked is deemed void ab initio.

A person that has received payment or delivery as the performance of an obligation based on a void act has an obligation to restore the other party to the original state.

Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding paragraph, if a person that receives payment or delivery as the performance of an obligation based on a void gratuitous act did not know that the act was void at the time of receiving the payment or delivery (or if the person did not know that the act may be revoked at the time of receiving the payment or delivery in the case of an act which is deemed void ab initio pursuant to the provisions of the preceding Article after the receipt of the payment or delivery), has an obligation to return to the extent currently enriched by the act.

Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (1), a person who has no mental capacity at the time of performing an act has an obligation to return to the extent currently enriched by the act. The same applies to a person who is a person with qualified legal capacity at the time of performing an act.

A revocable act may not be revoked after the person prescribed in Article 120 ratifies it.

If the counterparty to an act that may be revoked is identified, the revocation or ratification of that act is made by the manifestation of intention to the counterparty.

The ratification of a revocable act does not become effective unless it is made after the circumstances that made the act revocable cease to exist and the person ratifying the act becomes aware of the right to revoke it.

In the following cases, the ratification referred to in the preceding paragraph is not required to be made after the circumstances that made the act voidable cease to exist:

if a legal representative or a curator or assistant of a person with qualified legal capacity ratifies the act; or

if a person with qualified legal capacity (excluding an adult ward) ratifies the act with the consent of a legal representative, curator or assistant.

If, at or after the time when it becomes possible to ratify an act, any of the following facts occur with respect to a revocable act, it is deemed that the act has been ratified; provided, however, that this does not apply if an objection is reserved:

full or partial performance;

request for the performance;

novation;

provision of a security;

assignment of a part of or the whole of a right acquired by the revocable act; or

judicial enforcement.

The right to revoke an act is extinguished by the operation of the prescription if it is not exercised within five years from the time when it becomes possible to ratify the act. The same applies if 20 years have passed from the time of the act.

A juridical act subject to a condition precedent becomes effective upon fulfillment of the condition precedent.

A juridical act that is subject to a condition subsequent ceases to be effective upon fulfillment of the condition subsequent.

If the party manifests an intention to make the effects retroactive to the time of or any time before the time of the fulfillment, that intention prevails.

While it is uncertain whether or not a condition will be fulfilled, a party to a juridical act that is subject to a condition may not prejudice the other party's interests that would arise from the juridical act upon fulfillment of the condition.

While it is uncertain whether or not a condition will be fulfilled, the rights and obligations of the party concerned may be disposed of, inherited or preserved, or a security may be provided therefor, in accordance with the general provisions.

If a party that would suffer a detriment as a result of the fulfillment of a condition intentionally prevents the fulfillment of that condition, the counterparty may deem that the condition has been fulfilled.

If a party who would enjoy a benefit as a result of the fulfillment of a condition wrongfully has that condition fulfilled, the counterparty may deem that the condition has not been fulfilled.

If a condition has already been fulfilled at the time of a juridical act and that condition is a condition precedent, the juridical act constitutes an unconditional act; if that condition is a condition subsequent, the juridical act is void.

If it has already been established at the time of a juridical act that a condition will not be fulfilled and that condition is a condition precedent, the juridical act is void; if that condition is a condition subsequent, the juridical act constitutes an unconditional act.

In the cases referred to in the provisions of the preceding two paragraphs, the provisions of Article 128 and Article 129 apply mutatis mutandis until the relevant party becomes aware that the condition has been or has not been fulfilled.

A juridical act subject to an unlawful condition is void. The same applies to a juridical act subject to the condition that an unlawful act not be performed.

A juridical act subject to an impossible condition precedent is void.

A juridical act subject to an impossible condition subsequent is an unconditional juridical act.

A juridical act subject to a condition precedent is void if the condition is dependent only upon the intention of the obligor.

If a time of commencement is assigned to a juridical act, the performance of that juridical act may not be demanded before the arrival of that assigned time.

If time of expiration is assigned to a juridical act, that juridical act expires upon the arrival of that assigned time.

The time stipulation is presumed to be provided for the benefit of the obligor.

The benefit of time stipulation may be waived; provided, however, that the waiver may not prejudice the interest of the counterparty.

The obligor may not assert the benefit of time stipulation if:

the obligor has become subject to the order commencing bankruptcy proceedings;

the obligor has lost, damaged, or diminished the security; or

the obligor fails to provide security when it has the obligation to do so.

The method of computation of a period of time is governed by the provisions of this Chapter unless otherwise provided in the laws and regulations or a judicial order, or unless otherwise provided for by the relevant juridical act.

When a period is provided for in hours, the period commences immediately at the specified time.

When a period is provided for in days, weeks, months, or years, the first day of the period is not included in the computation; provided, however, that this does not apply when the period commences at twelve midnight.

In the case referred to in the preceding Article, the period expires at the end of the last day.

If the last day of a period falls on a Sunday, a holiday as provided in the Act on National Holidays (Act No. 178 of 1948), or any other holiday, only when it is customary not to do business on the relevant day, the period expires on the immediately following day.

If a period is provided for in weeks, months, or years, the period is calculated in accordance to the calendar.

If a period does not commence at the beginning of the week, month, or year, that period expires on the day immediately preceding the day which corresponds to the commencement day in the last week, month or year; provided, however, that if the period is provided for in months or years and the last month does not contain a corresponding day, the period expires on the last day of that month.

The prescription is retroactive to the commencement day.

The court may not make a judicial decision relying on prescription unless a party (in the case of extinctive prescription, including a guarantor, third-party collateral provider, third party acquirer, or any other person with a legitimate interest in the extinction of a right) invokes it.

The benefits of the prescription may not be waived in advance.

If any of the following grounds exists, the period of prescription does not expire until the ground ceases to exist (if the ground ceases to exist while the right remains undetermined by a final and binding judgment or anything that has the same effect as a final and binding judgment, until six months have passed from the time of cessation):

demand by litigation;

demand for payment;

settlement referred to in Article 275, paragraph (1) of the Code of Civil Procedure or conciliation under the Civil Conciliation Act (Act No. 222 of 1951) or the Domestic Relations Case Procedure Act (Act No. 52 of 2011); or

participation in bankruptcy proceeding, rehabilitation proceeding or reorganization proceedings.

In the case referred to in the preceding paragraph, if a right is determined by a final and binding judgment or anything that has the same effect as a final and binding judgment, a new period of prescription commences to run at the time when the grounds stated in the items of that paragraph cease to exist;

If any of the following grounds exists, the prescription period does not expire until those grounds cease to exist (or until six months after those grounds cease to exist, if they cease to exist due to the withdrawal of a petition or the rescission of a petition for failure to comply with the provisions of the law):

judicial enforcement;

enforcement of a security right;

auction under the rules of an auction for the enforcement of a security right prescribed in Article 195 of the Civil Enforcement Act (Act No. 4 of 1979); or

asset disclosure procedures prescribed in Article 196 of the Civil Enforcement Act or procedures for acquiring information from a third party prescribed in Article 204 of that Act.

In the case referred to in the preceding paragraph, a new period of prescription commences to run at the time when the grounds stated in the items of that paragraph cease to exist; provided, however, that this does not apply if the grounds cease to exist due to the withdrawal of a petition or the revocation of a petition for the failure to comply with the provisions of the law.

If either of the following grounds exists, the prescription period does not expire until six months have passed from the time when the ground ceases to exist:

provisional seizure; or

provisional disposition.

If a demand is made, the prescription period does not expire until six months have passed since the time of the demand.

A second demand made during the postponement of expiration of the prescription period granted on the ground of the first demand does not have the effect of postponement of expiration of prescription period under the provisions of the preceding paragraph.

If an agreement on holding a discussion concerning a right is made in writing, the prescription period does not expire until the earliest of the following points in time:

when one year has passed from the time of the agreement;

if the period during which the parties are to hold a discussion is specified by the agreement (limited to a period less than one year): when that period has expired; or

if one of the parties notifies the other party in writing of refusal to continue the discussion: when six months have passed from the time of the notice.

If an agreement referred to in the preceding paragraph is made a second time during the postponement of expiration of the prescription period granted pursuant to the provisions of that paragraph, the second agreement has the effect of postponement of expiration of prescription period under the provisions of the preceding paragraph; provided, however, that the period of that effect may not exceed five years in total from the time when the prescription period should have expired had the postponement of expiration of the prescription period not been granted.

An agreement referred to in paragraph (1) which is made during the postponement of expiration of the prescription period granted on the ground of a demand does not have the effect of postponement of expiration of prescription period under the provisions of that paragraph. The same applies to a demand made during the postponement of expiration of the prescription period granted pursuant to the provisions of that paragraph.

If an agreement referred to in paragraph (1) is made by means of an electronic or magnetic record (meaning a record used in computerized information processing which is created in electronic form, magnetic form, or any other form that cannot be perceived by the human senses; the same applies below), the agreement is deemed to have been made in writing and the provisions of the preceding three paragraphs apply thereto.

The provisions of the preceding paragraph apply mutatis mutandis to the notice referred to in paragraph (1), item (iii).

If a right is acknowledged, a new period of prescription commences to run at the time of the acknowledgment.

With respect to the disposition of the right of the other party, an acknowledgment referred to in the preceding paragraph does not require unlimited capacity to act or authority.

The postponement of the expiry of prescription period or the renewal of prescription period under the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148 is effective only between the parties with respect to whom grounds to postpone the expiry of prescription period or to renew prescription period have arisen and their successors.

The postponement of expiration of prescription period under the provisions of Articles 149 through 151 is effective only between the parties with respect to whom grounds to postpone the expiry of prescription period have arisen and their successors.

The renewal of period of prescription under the provisions of the preceding Article is effective only between the parties with respect to whom grounds to renew prescription period have arisen and their successors.

If the procedure regarding any of the grounds stated in the items of Article 148, paragraph (1) or the items of Article 149 is not carried out in relation to a person that is to receive the benefit of prescription, it does not have an effect of postponement of expiration of prescription period or renewal of prescription period under the provisions of Article 148 or Article 149 unless the person is notified of it.

If a minor or an adult ward has no legal representative during the period of six months preceding the expiration of the period of prescription, the prescription period does not expire with respect to that minor or adult ward until six months pass from the time when that minor or adult ward becomes a person with a capacity to act, or a legal representative assumes the position.

If a minor or an adult ward has a right vis-a-vis the minor's or the adult ward's father, mother, or guardian who manages the property, the prescription period does not expire with respect to that right until six months have passed from the time when that minor or adult ward becomes a person with capacity to act, or a succeeding legal representative assumes the position.

With respect to rights which the husband or wife has vis-a-vis the other spouse, the prescription period does not expire until six months have passed from the time of the dissolution of their marriage.

With respect to an estate, the prescription period does not expire until six months have passed from the time when the heir is identified, the administrator is appointed, or commencement of bankruptcy proceeding is ordered.

If it is impossible to carry out the procedure regarding any of the grounds stated in the items of Article 147, paragraph (1) or the items of Article 148, paragraph (1) upon the expiration of the period of prescription due to a natural disaster or other unavoidable serious event, the prescription period does not expire until three months have passed from the time when that impediment ceases to exist.

A person that possesses the property of another for 20 years peacefully and openly with the intention to own it acquires its ownership.

A person that possesses the property of another for 10 years peacefully and openly with an intention to own it acquires its ownership, if the person was acting in good faith and was not negligent at the time when the possession started.

A person that exercises a property right other than ownership peacefully and openly with the intention to do so on the person's own behalf acquires that right after the passage of 20 years or 10 years, according to the distinction provided for in the preceding Article.

The prescription under the provisions of Article 162 is renewed if the possessor discontinues the possession voluntarily or is deprived of that possession by another person.

The provisions of the preceding Article apply mutatis mutandis to the case under Article 163.

A claim is extinguished by prescription in the following cases:

if the obligee does not exercise the right within five years from the time when the obligee came to know that it was exercisable; or

if the obligee does not exercise the right within 10 years from the time when it became exercisable.

A claim or property right other than ownership is extinguished by prescription if not exercised within 20 years from the time when the right became exercisable.

The provisions of the preceding two paragraphs do not preclude the commencement of acquisitive prescription for the benefit of a third party that possesses the subject matter of a right with a time of commencement or a right subject to a condition precedent, at the time of commencing the possession; provided, however, that the holder of the right may demand acknowledgment from the possessor at any time to renew the prescription period.

To apply the provisions of paragraph (1), item (ii) of the preceding Article to the extinctive prescription of a claim for damages arising from the death or injury to persons, the phrase "10 years" in that item is deemed to be replaced with "20 years".

A claim for periodic payments is extinguished by prescription in the following cases:

if the obligee does not exercise each claim for the delivery of things such as money arising from the claim for periodic payments within 10 years from the time when the obligee comes to know that each claim is exercisable; or

if the obligee does not exercise each claim prescribed in the preceding item within 20 years from the time when it becomes exercisable.

The obligee of periodic payments may require its obligor at any time to issue a written acknowledgment in order to acquire the evidence of the renewal of period of prescription.

The period of prescription of a right determined by a final and binding judgment or anything that has the same effect as a final and binding judgment is 10 years even if a period of prescription shorter than 10 years is provided for.

The provisions of the preceding paragraph do not apply to a claim which is not yet due and payable at the time when it is determined.

No real right may be established other than those prescribed by laws including this Code.

The creation and transfer of a real right becomes effective solely by the manifestations of intention of the parties.

Acquisitions of, losses of and changes in real rights on immovables may not be duly asserted against any third parties, unless the same are registered pursuant to the applicable provisions of the Real Property Registration Act (Act No. 123 of 2004) and other laws regarding registration.

The transfer of a real right on movables may not be duly asserted against a third party, unless the movables are delivered.

If ownership and another real right on the same thing are acquired by the same person, the other real right is extinguished; provided, however, that this does not apply if that thing or the other real right is the object of the right of a third party.

If a real right other than ownership and another right for which that real right is the object are acquired by the same person, the other right is extinguished. In this case, the provisions of the proviso to the preceding paragraph apply mutatis mutandis.

The provisions of the preceding two paragraphs do not apply to possessory rights.

Possessory rights are acquired by possessing a thing with the intention to do so on one's own behalf.

Possessory rights may be acquired through an agent.

The transfer of possessory rights is effected by the delivery of the thing possessed.

If a transferee or the agent of a transferee is actually holding the thing possessed, the transfer of possessory rights may be effected by the parties' manifestations of intention alone.

If an agent manifests the intention to thenceforward possess a thing possessed by the agent on behalf of the principal, the principal thereby acquires the possessory rights.

If a thing is possessed through an agent, the principal orders that agent to thenceforward possess that thing on behalf of a third party, and that third party consents thereto, the third party acquires the possessory rights.

If it is assumed, due to the nature of the title, that a possessor does not have the intention to own, the nature of the possessor's possession does not change unless that possessor manifests the intention to own to the person that put the thing under that person's possession, or commences possession under a new title with an intention to own from that time.

A possessor is presumed to possess a thing with the intention to own, in good faith peacefully and openly.

If there is evidence of possession at two different points in time, it is presumed that possession continued during that interval.

A successor to a possessor may, as the successor chooses, assert either the successor's own possession only, or the successor's own possession together with that of the predecessor.

If a person asserts the possession of the predecessor together with the person's own, that person also succeeds to defects in those.

The possessor is presumed to lawfully have the rights that a possessor exercises with respect to the thing possessed.

A possessor in good faith acquires fruits derived from the thing possessed.

If a possessor in good faith is defeated in an action on the title that legally supports the possession, that possessor is deemed to be a possessor in bad faith as from the time when the action is filed.

A possessor in bad faith has the obligation to return fruits, and reimburse the price of fruits that the possessor has already consumed, damaged due to negligence, or failed to collect.

The provisions of the preceding paragraph apply mutatis mutandis to a person who takes possession of a thing through assault or duress or through concealment.

If a thing under one's possession has been lost or damaged due to grounds attributable to the possessor, a possessor in bad faith is liable to compensate the person recovering the thing for the entire damage, and a possessor in good faith is liable to compensate that person for the damage to the extent currently enriched as a result of that damage; provided, however, that a possessor that is without the intention to own the thing must compensate the person for the entire damage, even if the possessor has acted in good faith.

A person that commences the possession of movables peacefully and openly by a transactional act acquires the rights that are exercised with respect to the movables immediately if the person possesses it in good faith and without negligence.

In the cases provided for in the preceding Article, if the thing under one's possession constitutes stolen or lost property, the victim or the person that lost the thing may demand the return of that thing from the possessor within two years from the time of the loss or theft.

If a possessor has purchased stolen or lost property in good faith at an auction, in a public market, or from a merchant that sells similar things, the victim or the person that lost the thing may not recover the thing without reimbursing the possessor for the price paid.

A person possessing a non-domestic animal bred by another person acquires the rights to exercise with respect to that animal if the person possessing it was acting in good faith at the beginning of the possession and the owner of the animal does not demand its return from that person within one month from the time when that animal left the possession of its owner.

If a possessor returns a thing possessed by them, the possessor may have the person recovering the thing reimburse the possessor for the costs the possessor has paid for its preservation and other necessary expenses; provided, however, that if the possessor has acquired fruits, ordinary and necessary expenses are borne by the possessor.

With respect to the costs paid for by a possessor to improve the thing under their possession and other beneficial expenses, the possessor may have the person recovering the thing reimburse the possessor for either the costs the possessor has paid or the amount of the increased value, whichever the person recovering the thing chooses, but only if there is a current increase in value; provided, however, that with regard to a possessor in bad faith, the court may, at the request of the person recovering the thing, grant a reasonable period of time for the same.

A possessor may file a possessory action in accordance with the provisions of the following Article through Article 202. The same applies to a person that takes possession on behalf of another person.

If a possessor is obstructed from possession, the possessor may claim for the discontinuation of the obstruction and compensation by filing an action for maintenance of possession.

If a possessor is likely to be obstructed from possession, the possessor may demand either the prevention of the obstruction or for the submission of security for the damages by filing an action for preservation of possession.

If a possessor is forcibly dispossessed, the possessor may demand the restitution of the thing and claim compensation by filing an action for recovery of possession.

An action for recovery of possession may not be filed against a specific successor of a person that forcibly takes possession; provided, however, that this does not apply if that successor had knowledge of the fact that the person has unlawfully taken the possession.

An action for maintenance of possession must be filed during the obstruction or within one year after the obstruction stops; provided, however, that if the thing under one's possession has been damaged due to construction work and either one year has passed from the time when the construction was started or the construction has been completed, the action may not be filed.

An action for preservation of possession may be filed so long as the danger of obstruction exists. In this case, the provisions of the proviso to the preceding paragraph apply mutatis mutandis if the thing under one's possession is likely to be damaged by the construction work.

An action for recovery of possession must be filed within one year from the time when a possessor was forcibly dispossessed.

A possessory action does not preclude an action on title that legally supports the possession, and an action on title does not preclude a possessory action.

With respect to possessory actions, no judicial decision may be made on grounds relating to title that legally supports the possession.

Possessory rights are extinguished when the possessor renounces the intention to possess, or loses possession of the thing possessed by them; provided, however, that this does not apply if the possessor files an action for recovery of possession.

If a person possesses a thing through an agent, possessory rights are extinguished on the grounds stated below:

renunciation by the principal of intention to have agent possess;

manifestation of intention to the principal of an agent to hold the thing possessed on behalf of the agent itself or a third party; or

the agent has lost direct control over the thing possessed.

Possessory rights are not extinguished solely as a result of the extinction of the authority to represent.

The provisions of this Chapter apply mutatis mutandis if a person exercises their property rights with the intention to do so on their own behalf.

An owner has the rights to freely use, profit from and dispose of the thing owned, within the limits of laws and regulations.

Ownership in land extends to above and below the surface of the land, within the limits of laws and regulations.

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An owner of land may use the neighboring land to the extent necessary for the following purposes; provided, however, that the owner may not enter the dwelling house of the resident without the approval of the resident:

construction, removal or repair of barriers, buildings or other structures at or near the boundary;

investigation of boundary markers or surveying concerning boundaries; or

cutting of branches pursuant to the provisions of Article 233, paragraph (3).

In the case referred to in the preceding paragraph, the date and time, place, and method of use is to be chosen which causes the least damage to the owner of the neighboring land and to the person who is actually using the neighboring land (referred to as "user of the neighboring land" in this Article below).

A person who uses the neighboring land pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (1) must notify the owner and user of the neighboring land in advance of the purpose, date and time, place, and method of the use; provided, however, that if it is difficult to give notice in advance, it is sufficient to give notice without delay after starting the use.

In the case referred to in paragraph (1), if the owner or user of the neighboring land suffers damages, they may claim compensation.

An owner of land that is surrounded by other land and has no access to a public road may pass through the other land that surrounds that owner's land to reach a public road.

The preceding paragraph also applies if an owner cannot reach a public road without passing over a pond, lake, river, waterway, or sea, or if there is an extreme difference in height between the land and the public road on account of a cliff.

In the cases referred to in the preceding Article, the location and method of passage must be chosen so as to meet the needs of the person that is entitled to the right-of-way under the provisions of that Article and cause the least damage to the other land.

A person that holds the right-of-way under the provisions of the preceding Article may construct a road if necessary.

A person that is entitled to the right-of-way under the provisions of Article 210 must pay compensation for damage caused to the other land that the same person passes through; provided, however, that except for damage arising from the construction of a road, compensation may be paid on an annual basis.

If the partition of land creates a parcel of land that has no access to public roads, the owner of that parcel of land may pass to the public roads only through the lands owned by another person that participated in the partition. In this case, it is necessary to pay compensation.

The provisions of the preceding paragraph apply mutatis mutandis if the owner of land transfers part of the land to another person.

If an owner of land is unable to receive electricity, gas or tap water supply or any other continuous supply equivalent thereto (referred to as "continuous supply" in this paragraph and paragraph (1) of the following Article) without installing facilities on other land or using facilities owned by another person, the owner of land may install facilities on the other land or use facilities owned by the other person to the extent necessary to receive continuous supply.

In the case referred to in the preceding paragraph, the place and method of installation or use of the facilities are to be chosen which causes the least damage to other land or facilities owned by the other person (referred to as "other land, etc." in the following paragraph).

A person who installs facilities on other land or uses facilities owned by another person pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (1) must notify in advance the owner of other land, etc. and the person who is actually using the other land of the purpose, place and method of the installation or use.

In order to install facilities on other land or to use facilities owned by another person pursuant to the provisions of the same paragraph, a person who has the right pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (1) may use the other land in question or the land on which the facilities owned by the other person in question are located. In this case, the provisions of the proviso to paragraph (1), and paragraphs (2) through (4) of Article 209 apply mutatis mutandis.

A person who installs facilities on other land pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (1) must pay compensation for damage (excluding damage prescribed in Article 209, paragraph (4) as applied mutatis mutandis in the preceding paragraph) to the other land in question; provided, however, the compensation may be paid annually.

A person who uses facilities owned by another person pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (1) must pay compensation for damage caused by actions taken in order to initiate using the facilities.

A person who uses, pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (1), facilities owned by another person must bear the costs required for installation, reconstruction, repair and maintenance of the facilities in proportion to the benefits received.

If the partition of land creates a parcel of land that cannot receive continuous supply without installing facilities on other land, an owner of the land, in order to receive continuous supply, may install facilities only on other land owned by a person who participated in the partition. In this case, the provisions of paragraph (5) of the preceding Article do not apply.

The provisions of the preceding paragraph apply mutatis mutandis if an owner of land has transferred a part of the land to another person.

A landowner must not interfere with a natural water stream flowing from a neighboring land.

If a stream is blocked at low-lying ground due to a natural disaster or other unavoidable accident, an owner of a higher land may carry out construction work necessary to remove the impediment to the stream at that owner's own expense.

If a land suffers or is likely to suffer damage due to destruction or blockage of a structure installed on other land to store, discharge or draw water, the owner of that land may have the owner of that other land repair the structure or remove the impediments, or, if necessary, have the same carry out preventive construction work.

In the cases provided for in the preceding two Articles, if there are other customs with respect to the allocation of expenses, those customs prevail.

A landowner must not install a roof or other structures that discharge rainwater directly onto neighboring land.

An owner of a channel, moat, or other land containing a stream must not change the course or width of the same if the land on the other side is owned by another person.

If the land on both sides of a stream is owned by the owner of the land containing the stream, that owner may change the course or the width of the same; provided, however, that the owner must return the stream to its natural course at the point where the stream meets a neighboring land.

If there are customs that differ from the provisions of the preceding two paragraphs, those customs prevail.

An owner of a higher land may run water through lower lands to dry out that owner's higher land if that land is flooded, or to discharge surplus water for household or agricultural or industrial use until the water meets a public stream or sewerage system. In these cases, the location and method that cause the least damage to the lower ground must be selected.

A landowner may use a structure installed by the owner of higher or lower land in order to cause water from the landowner's land to pass through that land.

In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, the person using the other person's structure must bear the expenses of the installation and preservation of the structure in proportion to the benefit that person enjoys.

If an owner of land containing a stream needs to construct a dam, that owner may construct that dam by fixing it to the other side even if the land on the other side is owned by another person; provided, however, that the owner must pay compensation for damage arising as a result.

The owner of land on the other side of a dam may use the dam referred to in the preceding paragraph if that owner owns part of the land containing the stream.

The provisions of paragraph (2) of the preceding Article apply mutatis mutandis to the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph.

A landowner may install boundary markers, sharing the expenses with the owner of the neighboring land.

The expenses of installation and preservation of boundary markers are borne equally by neighbors; provided, however, that measuring expenses are borne in proportion to the area of each land.

If two buildings are owned by different owners and there is an open lot between them, each owner may install a fence on the boundary, sharing the expenses with the other owner.

If no agreement is reached between the parties, the fence referred to in the preceding paragraph must be a wooden fence, a bamboo fence or a fence made of similar material and must be two meters high.

The expenses of installation and preservation of the fences under the preceding Article are borne equally by the neighbors.

One of the neighboring owners may install a fence using materials better than those provided for in Article 225, paragraph (2) or elevating the height provided for under that paragraph; provided, however, that the relevant owner must bear the increase in expenses arising as a result of the same.

If there are customs that differ from the provisions of the preceding three Articles, those customs prevail.

Boundary markers, fences, walls, channels and moats installed on boundary lines are presumed to be co-owned by the neighbors.

The provisions of the preceding Article do not apply to a wall on a boundary line that constitutes part of a building.

If the height of a wall that separates two neighboring buildings of different heights is higher than the height of the lower building, the preceding paragraph also applies with respect to that portion of that wall that is higher than the lower building; provided, however, that this does not apply to fire walls.

One of neighboring owners may raise the height of a co-owned wall; provided, however, that if the wall cannot withstand the construction work, the relevant owner must reinforce that wall as necessary or rebuild the same at the owner's own expense.

If the height of a wall is raised pursuant to the provisions of the preceding paragraph, the raised portion is owned solely by the owner that carried out the construction work.

In the cases provided for in the preceding Article, if a neighbor suffers damage, that neighbor may claim compensation for the same.

If a tree or bamboo branch from neighboring land crosses a boundary line, the landowner may have the owner of that tree or bamboo sever that branch.

In the case referred to in the preceding paragraph, if the tree or bamboo belongs to several co-owners, any of the co-owners may cut off the branch.

In the case referred to in paragraph (1), an owner of land may cut off the branch in the following cases:

if the owner of the tree or bamboo does not cut off the branch within a reasonable period of time despite receiving a notice requesting the owner to do so;

if identity of the owner of the tree or bamboo cannot be ascertained, or the owner's whereabouts cannot be ascertained;

if there are pressing circumstances.

If a tree or bamboo root from neighboring land crosses a boundary line, the owner of the land may sever that root.

In order to construct a building, the building must be distanced 50 centimeters or more away from the boundary line.

If a person attempts to construct a building in violation of the provisions of the preceding paragraph, the owner of the neighboring land may have the construction suspended or changed; provided, however, that if one year passes from the time when that construction started or if that building is completed, the owner may only claim for damages.

A person that installs a window or porch (including a veranda, the same applies in the following paragraph) at a distance of less than one meter from a boundary line allowing the observation of the residential land of another person must put up a privacy screen.

The distance referred to in the preceding paragraph is calculated by measuring the length of a straight line from the point on the window or porch closest to the neighboring land, to where it reaches the boundary line at a right angle.

If there are customs that differ from the provisions of the preceding two Articles, those customs prevail.

In order to dig a well, service water pit, sewage pit or compost pit, the same must be distanced two or more meters from the boundary line, and in order to dig a pond, cellar or human waste pit, the same must be distanced one or more meters from the boundary line.

In order to bury water pipes, or dig a channel or moat, the water pipes, channel or moat must be distanced from the boundary line by a measurement equivalent to at least half the depth of the water pipes, channel or moat; provided, however, that the distance is not required to be exceeding one meter.

When carrying out a construction referred to in the preceding Article near a boundary line, necessary care must be taken to ensure the prevention of landslides or leakages of water or contaminated liquids.

Ownership of movables without an owner are acquired by possessing the same with the intention to own.

Ownerless immovables belong to the national treasury.

If the owner of lost property is not identified within three months of the time when public notice is effected as prescribed by the Lost Property Act (Act No. 73 of 2006), the person who found the lost property acquires ownership of the same.

If the owner of a buried thing is not identified within six months of the time when public notice is effected as prescribed by the Lost Property Act, the finder acquires ownership of the same; provided, however, that with respect to a buried thing discovered inside a thing that belongs to another person, the finder and that other person acquire equally proportionate ownership of that buried thing.

The owner of immovables acquires ownership of a thing that has been attached thereto as its appurtenance; provided, however, that the rights of the other person that attached that thing by virtue of a title are not prejudiced.

If two or more movable properties with different owners can no longer be separated without damage due to accession, the ownership of the composite thing belongs to the owner of the principal movable property. The same applies if excessive expense is required to separate the movables.

If the distinction of principal and accessory cannot be made between the movables united by accession, the owner of each movable property co-owns the composite thing in proportion to the respective price current at the time of the accession.

The provisions of the preceding two Articles apply mutatis mutandis if the things of different owners are mixed together and can no longer be distinguished.

If a person (referred to as "processor" in this Article below) adds labor to another person's movables, the ownership of the processed thing belongs to the owner of the material; provided, however, that if the value derived from the work significantly exceeds the value of the material, the processor acquires ownership of the processed thing.

In the cases prescribed in the preceding paragraph, if the processor provides a portion of the materials, the processor acquires ownership of the processed thing only if the value of provided materials added to the value derived from the labor exceeds the value of the other person's materials.

If the ownership of a thing is extinguished pursuant to the provisions of Article 242 through the preceding Article, other rights existing on that thing are also extinguished.